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ABSTRACT: In Nicomachean Ethics VII Aristotle describes akrasia as a dis-
position. Taking into account that it is a disposition, I argue that akrasia cannot 
be understood on an epistemological basis alone, i.e., it is not merely a prob-
lem of knowledge that the akratic person acts the ways he does, but rather one 
is akratic due to a certain kind of habituation, where the person is not able to 
activate the potential knowledge s/he possesses. To stress this point, I focus on 
the gap between potential knowledge and its activation, whereby I argue that 
the distinction between potential and actual knowledge is at the center of the 
problem of akrasia. I suggest that to elaborate on this gap, we must go beyond 
the limits of Nicomachean Ethics to Metaphysics IX, where we find Aristotle’s 
discussion of the distinction between potentiality and actuality. I further ana-
lyze the gap between potential and actual knowledge by means of Aristotle’s 
discussion of practical syllogism, where I argue that akrasia is a result of a 
conflict in practical reasoning. I conclude my paper by stressing that for the 
akratic person the action is determined with respect to the conclusion of the 
practical syllogism, where the conclusion is produced by means of a ‘conflict’ 
between the universal opinion which is potential and the particular opinion 
which is appetitive.
KEY-WORDS: akrasia, knowledge, potentiality, actuality, action, sources of 
action, practical syllogism, appetitive desire.
Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics1 VII states that akrasia (incontinence) is a 
disposition (hexis)2 whereby one possesses the knowledge of how (one ought) 
to act, yet this knowledge cannot be exercised.3 As Devin Henry suggests, tra-
ditional approaches to Aristotle’s treatment of the issue can be divided into two 
main camps: “those that believe he reduces all akrasia to some form of culpa-
ble ignorance; and those that believe he allows for genuine cases of akrasia in 
1  Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, transl. by Ross, D., Oxford University Press, New York 
2009.
2  Idem, 11451a32-34.
3  Idem, 1147a10-18.
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which the agent acts against full knowledge”.4 
My aim in this paper is not to offer a solution to the question “what is Ar-
istotle’s position concerning akrasia?” rather, in agreement with Filip Grgic, 
who argues that “the explanation of akrasia can by no means be exhausted by 
the explanation of the akratic’s knowledge”;5 I want to draw attention to the 
multilayered discussion that surrounds the problem of akrasia. I, too contend 
that insofar as akrasia is a disposition, it cannot be understood on epistemo-
logical basis alone, i.e., it is not a problem of knowledge that the incontinent 
person acts the way she/he does, but rather one is akratic due to a certain kind 
of habituation whereby the person is not able to exercise the knowledge s/he 
possesses. 
Focusing on this point, I argue that the gap between potential knowledge 
and its activation is at the center of the problem of akrasia - and to elaborate 
this gap, I suggest that we must go beyond the limits of Nicomachean Ethics 
to Metaphysics IX, where we find the distinction between potentiality and ac-
tuality. 
Finally, I make some conclusions in my paper with a discussion on the role 
of the practical syllogism, where I argue that the gap between potential and 
actual knowledge must be understood on the basis of a conflict of practical 
reasoning.
Aristotle stresses the gap between the possession of knowledge and its ac-
tivation in the following passage: ‘since we use the word ‘know’ in two senses 
(for both the man who has knowledge but is not using it and he who is using 
it said to know), it will make a difference whether, when a man does what he 
should not, he has the knowledge but is not exercising it’, [NE, 1146b31-36 
(emphasis not mine)]. According to the above passage, one is said to know in 
two senses, when one possesses the knowledge but is unable to exercise it, 
and when one acts according to the knowledge one possesses. In the context 
of the akratic person, there is the capacity (potentiality) to act according to 
one’s knowledge, but this capacity remains inactive, it cannot be activated or 
exercised. In other words, one’s potential knowledge is not actualized. I argue 
that the distinction between “having knowledge” and “exercising knowledge” 
Aristotle makes in the above passage can be better grasped in relation to his 
discussion of potentiality (dunamis) and actuality (energeia) in Metaphysics 
IX.6 
As I will demonstrate, the knowledge that is possessed, but not yet activat-
4  Henry, D., “Aristotle on pleasure and the worst form of akrasia”, Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice, 5 (2002), 256.
5  Grgic, F., “Aristotle on the akratic’s knowledge”, Phronesis, 47 (2002), 337.
6  Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Sachs, J., Green Lion Press, Santa Fe, 2002.
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ed, is potential knowledge, whereas the knowledge that is exercised is actual 
knowledge. According to Aristotle, as stressed in Metaphysics IX, each poten-
tiality is a potentiality of its actuality, since “what is at work always comes into 
being from what is in potency”.7 
Let us consider this point with an example: one is able to speak German, 
because one possesses the knowledge of German in his/her soul, however, it 
is only when the person speaks German that his/her knowledge of German is 
actualized. That is to say, the actualization of knowledge refers to an activity 
in conformity with the possessed knowledge, which is potential in character 
before it has been actualized. This point further confirms my argument that the 
akratic person has potential knowledge but cannot activate that knowledge, 
since the activation of that potential knowledge would amount to acting in 
accordance with one’s knowledge. 
Therefore, what is important to notice in this regard is the fact that each 
potentiality (dunamis) is capable of both being and not-being, since, as Aristo-
tle stresses, “what is capable of being admits both of being and of not being”.8 
Hence, it is possible that the potential knowledge is not actualized. To put 
it differently, not every potentiality is necessarily actualized since the term 
‘dunamis’ precisely refers to this inactive state of being which has both the 
capacity of remaining inactive as well as to be activated.9 Hence, the question 
that needs to be addressed in the context of akrasia is this: why is there a gap 
between these two kinds of knowledge in the akratic person? Or better stated: 
why is the potential knowledge of the incontinent person not activated? As 
Aristotle notes, it is because of his/her “appetitive desires”10 that the akratic 
person cannot activate his/her potential knowledge.11
Before discussing the role of the passions in relation to the practical syllo-
gism, I want to focus more specifically on the gap between potential and actual 
7  Idem, 1049b26.
8  Idem, 1050b12-13.
9  Charlotte Witt emphasizes the importance of inactive dunamis for Aristotle: ‘It is important 
to see that what is at issue between actualist and is not the existence of dunamis, but the ex-
istence of inactive dunamis’, Witt Ch., Ways of being, potentiality an actuality in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, Cornell University, Ithaca, 2003, 18.
10  According to Aristotle, in NE I.13, the soul has three parts; rational, vegetative and appeti-
tive. Appetitive part is also referred to as “the desiring element” of the soul (NE, 1102b30-31). 
According to Hendrik Lorenz, Aristotle formulation of appetitive desires are those “desires 
which arise independently of one’s thoughts about what is best to do”, since they are simply 
directed to that which is pleasant or pleasurable, see Lorenz, H., The brute within, appetitive 
desire in Plato and Aristotle, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006, 122.
11  Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Ross, D., Oxford University Press, New York, 
2009, 1145b12-14
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knowledge in order to account for the force of appetitive desire in the determi-
nation of action. According to Claudia Baracchi, we find a gap between poten-
tial and actual knowledge in the akratic person, because the potential knowl-
edge that is possessed is not a result of experience. In other words, knowledge 
is detached from experience and so it is unable to make one “hold together 
and harmonize” “one’s logos (reason and judgment) and one’s emotions and 
drives”.12 In Met. XIII.10 Aristotle states that potential knowledge is about 
the universal and is indeterminate, whereas actual knowledge is of something 
determinate. This statement confirms Baracchi’s assessment that the knowl-
edge of the akratic person is detached from experience. It is detached from 
experience precisely because it is about the universal and not the particular, 
and insofar as it is about the universal and indeterminate, it fails to determine 
the action. A reading that incorporates Met. XIII.10 into the discussion of the 
gap between having knowledge and exercising knowledge suggests that the 
potential knowledge that is possessed by the akratic person is universal and 
not determinate, and because of that, it cannot determine a specific action. The 
distinction between the universal and the particular in relation to the prob-
lem of akrasia will become clearer as we now look at the next passage about 
the practical syllogism. Aristotle writes: ‘since there are two kinds of premiss, 
there is nothing to prevent a man’s having both premisses and acting against 
his knowledge, provided that he is using only the universal premiss and not 
the particular; for it is particular acts that have to be done’, (NE, 1147a1-4).
Practical judgments can be attained through the use of a syllogistic method, 
that is, a reasoning process that has a syllogistic form, where there is a univer-
sal premiss, a middle term, which is a particular premiss which is perceptual, 
and a conclusion. The conclusion is the practical judgment itself. As he notes 
above, in the case of the akratic person, only the universal premiss is prop-
erly used and not the particular - hence practical judgment cannot inform the 
action. Thus, what Aristotle means by “having knowledge” is precisely ‘the 
having of a universal opinion and this is the sense in which the akratic person 
knows what she/he is doing is bad, because she/he has a universal opinion’ 
(e.g., not all pleasurable things should be sought). 
However, the action cannot be determined on the basis of this universal 
opinion, since the universal opinion, insofar as it is universal and therefore 
not determinate, has less force compared to the particular opinion, which is 
perceptual in character and directed towards the pleasant thing. The particular 
opinion, then, as it is perceptual in nature and about the particular pleasant 
thing, is more influential in determining the action, since it is coupled with ap-
12  Baracchi, C., Aristotle’s ethics as first philosophy, Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2011, 231-232.
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petitive/desiring power of the soul. Next, I will further dwell on this point with 
respect to Aristotle’s discussion of the sources of action in De Anima. 
According to Aristotle in De Anima 433a16-20,13 there are three main 
sources for action in relation to a pleasant thing: 
a. a pleasant object (the object of appetite), 
b. the power of appetite (or capacity to desire), and 
c. practical thought (active state of practical mind)14 
The object of appetite starts the movement first by activating the soul’s ca-
pacity to desire. Soul’s capacity to desire, however, cannot be activated with-
out perception, since one needs to perceive the object in order to desire it. This 
is why, Aristotle stresses that the practical mind cannot produce action without 
the power to desire and sense.15 
In the same passage, Aristotle also emphasizes that in the process of pro-
ducing action there is a form of syllogism at work in the practical mind, on 
account of which the action is determined, according to the conclusion of the 
practical syllogism. In the case of akrasia then, what we are concerned with is 
a kind of action that pursues a pleasant thing (e.g., this here is sweet and there-
fore pleasant) regardless of the universal opinion that forbids one to do so. In 
the non-akratic person on the contrary the universal opinion is not in conflict 
but rather ‘harmonized’ with the particular perceptual opinion and the person 
acts in accordance with practical knowledge. Thus, as I have argued along 
with Baracchi, the gap between potential and actual knowledge is an outcome 
of one’s inability to work together (and harmonize) the capacities such as the 
practical mind and the desiring/appetitive element of the soul. As a result, in 
the akratic person there is a conflict between the practical mind and appetite.
What we thus find here with akrasia in the cognitive level is an inability 
to integrate the universal with the particular. This, however, is not a cognitive 
problem since the cognition here is practical, i.e., the capacity to think or judge 
well in practical matters is acquired and not natural as Aristotle points out in 
NE II. This is why akrasia is described as a disposition (hexis) by Aristotle, as 
it is a state of character that is acquired through practice. Hence, I contend that 
the inability to harmonize the universal opinion and the particular perceptual 
13  Aristotle, “De Anima (on the soul)” in Basic Works of Aristotle, McKeon, R., (ed.), trans. 
Smith, J.A., Modern Library, New York, 2001.
14  Gerasimos Santas argues that the cause of action is neither thought nor desire alone but the 
co-presence of the two. Christoper Long on the other hand, following Nussbaum, stresses the 
role of sense and also of imagination. Santas, G., “Aristotle on practical inference, the expla-
nation of action, and akrasia”, Phronesis, 14 (1969), 170.; Long, Ch.P., The Ethics of Ontology, 
Rethinking Aristotelian Legacy, SUNY Press, Albany, 2004, 140.
15  Aristotle, “De Anima (on the soul)” in Basic Works of Aristotle, McKeon, R., (ed.), trans. 
Smith, J.A., Modern Library, New York, 2001, 433a17-19.
opinion in the thought process of the incontinent is not a cognitive failure but 
rather a matter of not knowing how, because the potential knowledge that is 
possessed by the akratic person is not gained through experience, rather it is a 
universal knowledge which has no determinate character.
To conclude, in the akratic person the action is determined with respect to 
the conclusion of the practical syllogism insofar as it is the result of the pro-
cess of deliberation. However, the conclusion of the syllogism is produced by 
means of a ‘conflict’ between the universal and particular opinion. Hence, in 
the akratic person, the two kinds of premisses (universal and particular) are in 
conflict. Yet, they are not in conflict due to a cognitive inability, but precisely 
because the potential knowledge, which has universal value, is not determined 
through practice and as a result of which it is the desiring/appetitive element 
that produces the action.
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